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Abstract 
The article provides an analysis of the most important judgments rendered by 
Slovak courts at the end of 2010, in the course of 2011 and at the beginning of 2012. 
The article focuses solely on judicial review of decisions issued by the National 
Competition Authority of the Slovak Republic. 
Slovak courts dealt with several key issues concerning public enforcement 
of competition law such as: the application of the so-called ‘general clause’; 
competences of the Slovak competition authority in regulated sectors; and the 
application of the economic continuity test. Some of the conclusions resulting from 
these judgments may be considered disputable. It may be argued, in particular, that 
they may jeopardize the effective enforcement of competition law in the Slovak 
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Republic. At the same time, the discussed jurisprudence has managed to clarify 
a number of key issues which had been subject to debate for a number of years. The 
article presents a review of these judgments, summarizes their key conclusions and 
considers their possible impact on the system of public enforcement of competition 
law in the Slovak Republic. The article is divided into a number of parts, each of 
which covers an individual case, the titles of which refers to the main topic that was 
under discussion in the presented judgment. 
Résumé
Cet article analyse les décisions les plus importantes rendues par les cours slovaques 
en fin de l’année 2010, au cour de l´année 2011 et au debut de l´anneé 2012. 
L’article traite exclusivement la révision judiciaire des décisions rendues par Bureau 
antimonopole de la République slovaque.
Les cours slovaques se sont penchées sur quelques questions clés relatif à 
l’application du droit de la concurrence tel que l´application de la clause générale, 
l´autorité de Bureau antimonopole de la République slovaque dans les secteurs 
régulés et l´application du test de la continuité économique.
Certains conclusions résultants de ces décisions peuvent être considérées comme 
litigieuses.
En particulier, il peut être soutenu que ces décisions peuvent affecter l’application 
effective du droit compétitif en République slovaque. Il est à noter que certains de 
ces décisions ont éclairé les questions qui ont été discutées pendant plusieurs années. 
Cette contribution donne un aperçu de ces susdites décisions, résume les principales 
conclusions découlant de ces décisions et analyse l´influence potentiel sur le système 
de l´application public du droit de la concurrence en République slovaque. La 
contribution est divisée en plusieurs parties, chacune d’entre elles consacrée à un 
cas particulier, les titres des articles sur des thèmes clés, qui se consacre à la décision.
Classifications and key words: economic continuity test; mitigating circumstance; 
competence; sectoral regulation; general clause; reduction of fine; unlawful 
operation on the market
I. Introduction
When it comes to the judicial review of its recent decisions, the Slovak 
competition authority – the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic 
(hereafter, the AMO) – has little reason to celebrate. The number of cases 
that it has lost before Slovak courts significantly exceeds the number of its 
decisions being upheld. 
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Courts often either completely annul AMO’s decisions or reduce the fine 
imposed therein to a symbolic amount only. There can be no doubt that 
the enforcement of competition cases in Slovakia has become harder in 
recent years. Courts often annul AMO’s decisions merely with reference to 
procedural errors that occurred during the proceedings before the competition 
authority, without even beginning to deal with the merits of the case subject 
of the judicial review. 
Considering the small number of court cases actually won by the AMO, 
years 2010–2012 do not differ substantially from earlier years. Nevertheless, a 
small amount of hope exists for the competition authority since the Supreme 
Court of the Slovak Republic, acting as the court of appeals for competition 
cases, reversed recently a number of first instance judgments that were adverse 
to the AMO upholding, in turn, the competition authority’s original decisions. 
The aim of this paper is to present the most interesting cases subject to 
judicial review at the end of 2010, in the year 2011 and at the beginning 
of 2012.
II. General remarks 
It is worth starting the paper with a brief introduction of the system of 
judicial review of the decisions issued by the AMO – the National Competition 
Authority (hereafter, NCA) of the Slovak Republic. In Slovakia, the rules of 
judicial review of administrative decisions are set forth by the Act No. 99/1963 
Coll. – the Civil Procedural Code as amended (hereafter, Civil Procedural 
Code), particularly in its part named ‘Administrative justice’.
AMO decisions are taken on the basis of a 2-instance system. In the first 
instance, the executive body of the AMO1 issues a decision, which may be 
reviewed by the Council of the AMO. When a decision in a particular case 
is issued by the Council of the AMO and becomes final, the participants of 
the administrative proceedings have the right to bring the case before a court 
within 2 months from the day when the decision became final. The legal 
instrument used for that purpose is an action2 to be filed with the respective 
court within two months from the day when the last instance decision of the 
authority was delivered to the participant. The court that has the competence 
1 Division of Agreements Restricting Competition, Division of Abuse of a Dominant 
Position or Division of Concentrations.
2 The action is admissible only under the proviso that a party to a proceedings before the 
AMO appealed the decision of the executive body of the AMO to the Council of the AMO. 
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to review the decision of the AMO is the Regional Court in Bratislava, acting 
as the court of first instance in matters of competition law. 
If the court decides that the contested decision and the preceding 
administrative procedures comply with the law, the court renders a judgment 
dismissing the action. If it rules against the appealed decision, it reverses 
the AMO decision and refers the case back to the competition authority for 
renewed assessment. Together with the decision of the Council of the AMO, 
the court may reverse also the first instance decision. Since 2002, the court 
has also the right to change the amount of the fine imposed by the AMO. 
Unsatisfied parties, usually both the claimant and the AMO, can appeal the 
judgment of the Regional Court.
The Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic reviews the judgment of the 
Regional Court acting in this respect as the court of appeals for competition 
law cases. The Supreme Court may reverse, affirm, or change the judgment 
of the court of first instance. 
Even after the judgement of the Supreme Court becomes final, the party to 
the judicial proceeding may lodge a complaint to the Constitutional Court of 
the Slovak Republic, when it assumes, that the court breached its fundamental 
rights or freedoms during the foregoing judicial proceedings. In case the 
complaint of the complainant is justified, the Constitutional Court annuls 
the faulty judgement and refers the case back to the court, that issued the 
respective judgement. 
III.  Application of the ‘economic continuity test’ as a mitigating 
circumstance
The judgment of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic concerning the 
abuse of a dominant position by the Railway Company Cargo, a.s. (hereafter, 
Cargo), case no. 1 Sžhpú/1/20113
The Cargo proceedings are historically the first case where the European 
Commission submitted to Slovak courts its written observations to a competi-
tion law case under Article 15 (3) of Regulation 1/20034.
3 The judgment of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic of 31 January 2012. 
4 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ [2003] L 1/1: ‘Where 
the coherent application of Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty so requires, the Commission, 
acting on its own initiative, may submit written observations to courts of the Member States. 
With the permission of the court in question, it may also make oral observations’.
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In 2006, the AMO found that Cargo has abused its dominant position and 
imposed upon it a heavy fine in the amount of c. 2 490 000 Euro5. Cargo is 
a company owned by the Slovak Republic. It carries out railway transport 
and business activities and, in particular, transport and carriage services of 
goods in rail-freight traffic. In respective time, Cargo provided a rail-freight 
transport of a large amount of cement on a number of routes, including the 
route Rohožník-Devínska Nová Ves state border to the company Holcim 
(Slovakia), a.s. (hereafter, Holcim). Holcim carried out business activities in 
a sector of producing and selling cement and other construction materials. 
Holcim purchased rail-freight services from Cargo via three shipping 
companies. Cargo sold its services to shipping companies on the basis of 
consignments, which were concluded every year. The contracts included 
also agreements on prices. In terms of these agreements, Cargo provided its 
services to shipping companies for discounted prices compared to general 
tariffs, which otherwise applied. 
The said abuse occurred when Holcim planned to purchase rail-freight 
services of cement on the route Rohožník-Devínska Nová Ves state border 
from the company LTE, a.s., instead of Cargo, because LTE’s offer was 
more advantageous to Holcim. At that time, LTE, a.s. was a new entrant on 
the recently liberalised railway market, making it a competitor of Cargo. As 
a reaction to this situation, Cargo terminated its existing agreements on prices 
with two shipping companies providing rail-freight transport services to the 
company Holcim.
Because of the actions of the dominant entity (Cargo), shipping companies 
planned to increase the prices for the transport on all the routes covered 
by the contract between Cargo and Holcim an unfavourable development 
for Holcim. Consequently, Holcim terminated the planned cooperation with 
LTE and signed a contract on the provision of all its rail-freight transport 
services with Cargo. Hence, the dominant company effectively eliminated LTE 
from the relevant market for the provision of rail-freight transport of a large 
amount of cement on the route Rohožník- Devínska Nová Ves state border. 
The anticompetitive behaviour of Cargo affected trade between EU 
Member States. Thus, the Slovak competition authority applied Article 82 of 
the EC Treaty (current Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, hereafter TFEU). 
Cargo was established on 1 January 2005 as a result of the division of 
the former passenger and freight rail traffic operator – Železničná spoločnosť, 
a.s. The former operator has been split into two legal successors: Železničná 
spoločnosť, a.s. (for the supply of passenger transport services) and Cargo (for 
5 Decision of the AMO Council no. 2006/DZ/R/2/144 issued on 22 December 2006 in 
conjunction with the decision of the AMO no. 2006/DZ/2/1/067 issued on 3 June 2006. 
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the supply of services of rail-freight transport). Considering the timeframe of 
the infringement, part of the alleged anticompetitive behaviour took place 
before the legal separation of the two operators, while part occurred during 
the existence of Cargo. 
The Slovak competition authority applied here the ‘economic continuity 
test’ under the criteria set out by the jurisprudence6 of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union. On this basis, Cargo was found responsible for the entire 
duration of the anticompetitive behaviour despite the fact that no provision 
of Slovak law explicitly enables the AMO to prosecute a successor company 
for the conduct of its predecessor7.
The Regional Court in Bratislava reviewed the decision issued by the AMO 
and decided to substantially reduce the fine originally imposed on Cargo (from 
2 490 000 to c. 299 000 Euro8). The Court confirmed the accuracy of the AMO’s 
use of the economic continuity test despite the lack of a clear legal basis for 
doing so. The Court stressed in particular that Cargo took over both material 
and legal assets of its predecessor and continued with the performance of the 
same economic activities. 
Nevertheless, the Court decided to substantially reduce the fine. Above all, 
it referred to the fact that the sanction in this case did not fulfil a preventive 
function; the Court said that the AMO should have considered the fact that 
Cargo did not, in fact, participate in the illegal conduct for the whole duration 
of the abuse. The Court said, in essence, that it was necessary to consider the 
application of the economic continuity test as a quasi-mitigating circumstance 
in this case. 
The conclusion reached by the first instance court is rather controversial. 
Does it mean that an undertaking can avoid responsibility or punishment by 
virtue of a mere structural change? 
The AMO appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of the Slovak 
Republic which changed the judgment of the Regional Court in Bratislava 
completely dismissing Cargo’s original appeal. 
6 According to EU jurisprudence, conditions to be met in this case are: 1) the new company 
continues the activity of the entity that has committed a violation, i.e. continuity of the economic 
activities of these two companies exists, and, 2) the original entity has ceased to exist. See 
judgments: joined cases 40-48, 50, 54-56, 111,113 and 114-73 Cooperatieve Vereniging Suiker unie 
UA (SU) and others v Commission, ECR [1975] 1163; joined cases 29/83 and 30/83 Compagnie 
Royale Asturienne des Mines SA and Rheizink GmbH v Commission, ECR [1984] 1679; C-49/92 P 
Commission v Anic Partecipazioni SpA, ECR [1999] I-4125; joined cases C-204/00 P, C-211/00 P, 
C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P Aalborg Portland A/S and others v Commission, ECR [2004] I-00123. 
7 The AMO followed the concept whereby undertakings cannot escape antitrust liability 
under national company law by simply restructuring, see e.g. Van bael & Bellis, Competition 
law of the European Community, Hague 2005, p. 39.
8 Case no. 1 S 27/2007, judgment of 6 December 2007. 
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Cargo was the first case where the European Commission submitted to 
a Slovak court its written observations on the applicability of Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU. The Commission pointed out that the economic continuity 
test should be applied equally in all EU Member States. The effective use 
of this concept does not only translate into the finding of a successor’s 
responsibility for the activities of its predecessor, but also the ascertainment 
of its responsibility in extenso. The Commission noted also that there was 
a strong link between finding responsibility and imposing a fine and stated 
that the consideration of the application of the economic continuity test as 
the mitigating circumstance would render the application of EU competition 
rules effective. 
The Slovak Supreme Court referred first to the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice of the EU regarding the nature and function of the economic continuity 
test. Surprisingly, it refused to deal with the statements and pleas submitted 
by Cargo in its reaction to AMO’s appeal (including pleas impugning the 
responsibility of Cargo for the illegal conduct, the liquidating character of the 
fine imposed etc.). The Supreme Court referred to the Roman law principle – 
vigilantibus iura scripta sunt. It pointed out that since Cargo did not appeal the 
decision of the Regional Court in Bratislava, it acknowledged its responsibility 
for the anticompetitive behaviour at hand. The Supreme Court suggested also 
that by decreasing the fine imposed, the Regional Court usurped for itself 
the competences of the administrative body. The first instance court did so, 
despite the fact that it did not properly reason its conclusions and did not 
present any new evidence with regard to its possible doubts. 
The Supreme Court referred to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice 
of the EU in the case C-150/94 United Kingdom v the Council of the European 
Union9 where it was stated that: ‘the Court cannot substitute its assessment 
for that of the Council as to the appropriateness or otherwise of the measures 
adopted, if those measures have not been shown to be manifestly inappropriate 
for achieving the objective pursued’.
The Slovak Supreme Court concluded that neither the principle of legitimate 
expectations, nor the principle of equal treatment, was breached by the AMO 
in its administrative proceeding. It pointed out that the competition authority 
respected the limits set upon it by both Slovak and EU law and thus there was 
no reason to impugn the discretion of the administrative body. According to 
the Supreme Court, courts should not review the accuracy of the discretionary 
powers awarded to administrative bodies; it should review only the conformity 
of its discretion with the law. 
9 ECR [1998] I-7235.
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With respect to the amount of the fine imposed, the Supreme Court did not 
agree with the opinion of the Regional Court in Bratislava whereby the AMO 
unreasonably stressed its repressive function. It emphasized that the aim of 
sanctions is both prevention and repression. According to the Supreme Court, 
these two functions of administrative fines cannot be separated. 
All this notwithstanding, the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic 
reversed in 2011 the said judgment of the Supreme Court10 due to procedural 
mistakes that were committed by the Supreme Court. The subsequent 
judgment of the Supreme Court issued in January 2012 constrains, however, 
the same wording as its earlier ruling in this case.11 
This case shows how the cooperation between national courts and the 
Commission may help in judicial reviews of competition law decisions, 
especially in new Member States, where the courts do not have sufficient 
experience with the application of EU competition law. 
IV.  Competences of the Slovak Antimonopoly Office 
in regulated sectors 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic in case 
eustream, a.s. (hereafter, eustream)12, case no. 4Sžh 1/2010
This case concerned the judicial review of an AMO decisions13 concerning 
the abuse of a dominant position committed by eustream on the relevant 
market for the provision of connection services to the natural gas transmission 
network. The scrutinised abuse took the form of the use by eustream of an 
unfair trading condition. According to the AMO, eustream made connecting 
a distributional company to its transmission network conditional upon the sale 
of the connecting facility. The said abuse occurred when eustream and the 
distributional company negotiated a contract of connecting a distributional 
network of a distributional company to a transmission network. In order to 
connect to the transmission network, the distributional company built up 
a connecting facility on its own expenses. At the end of the negotiating process, 
10 Judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic of 14 June 2011, case 
no. III. ÚS 170/2011-46.
11 Judgment of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic of 31 January 2012, case 
no. 1/Sžhpú1/2011. 
12 Judgment of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic of 28 April 2011 in case 
no. 4Sžh1/2010.
13 Decision of the Council of the AMO no. 2008/DZ/R/2/076 of 26 Septmber 2008 in 
conjunction with the decision of the AMO no. 2007/DZ/2/1/105 of 14 December 2007.
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eustream laid the claim of the sale of the connecting facility. The distributional 
company accepted this condition in order to prevent damages that might have 
resulted from breaking its own contractual obligations in case the connection 
to the transmission network had not been realized.
In its judgment, the Regional Court in Bratislava dismissed the appeal action 
submitted by eustream and upheld the decision of the AMO14. One of the key 
issues discussed in the judgment was the NCA’s competences in regulated 
sectors and the potential risk of breaching the ne bis in idem principle by the 
parallel exercise of the powers of the competition authority and sector-specific 
regulator (hereafter, National Regulatory Authority, NRA)15. The court stated 
that unless a NRA takes a particular action or a legal provision exists which 
enables it to punish an undertaking for certain unlawful behaviours, it is not 
possible to refuse the competences of the AMO in regulated sectors. The 
court apparently followed the concept whereby no anticompetitive behaviour 
should remain non-punishable. In other words, according to the first instance 
court, the competences of the AMO in regulated sectors would be excluded in 
cases when an appropriate sector-specific rule exists (provision of the law or a 
particular action of the regulator) that can be enforced by the relevant NRA. 
The Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic took a different stance and 
changed the judgment of the Regional Court annulling at the same time the 
original decisions of the AMO. By doing so, it opened the discussion on the 
exercise of the powers of Slovak competition authority in regulated sectors. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court dealt with this issue in light of the facts 
of the case at hand making it difficult to draw general conclusions from the 
judgment. It is, however, possible to see that the Supreme Court’s attitude 
towards the competences of the AMO was different to that shown by the 
first instance court. It is apparent, that the Supreme Court did not accept the 
interpretation of the Regional Court. It seems that according to the Supreme 
Court, it is sufficient to establish whether the law potentially enables a NRA 
to act in order to assess the existence of the AMO’s competences in regulated 
sectors. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the fact that market behaviour 
can be adjusted by a given NRA excludes the competences of the AMO in 
that regulated sector. 
It is worth noting that the competition authority disagreed with the opinions 
of both courts, be it the judgment of the Regional Court or the ruling of 
the Supreme Court. However, the approach of the first instance court is 
somewhat more acceptable. It is important in this context to pay attention to 
the jurisprudence of the courts of the European Union. According to latest EU 
judgments, the competences to act of NCAs cannot be excluded unless a given 
14 Judgment of the Regional Court in Bratislava of 30 June 2010 in case no. 2S/204/2008.
15 In Slovakia, it is the Regulatory Office For Network Industries. 
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regulator had directly obliged an undertaking to engage in anticompetitive 
behaviour and the ‘regulated’ undertaking did not have any other possibility 
than to comply with the obligations set out by that NRA16. 
It is indisputable that competition authorities and sector-specific regulators 
are both established to protect competition. However, unlike NCAs, the purpose 
of NRAs is the imposition of ex ante rules in areas where competition does 
not work properly. By contrast, competition authorities prosecute ex-post anti-
competitive behaviour17. Both entities have at their disposal different legal 
instrument to exercise their powers. A NRA cannot, for instance, sanction 
the abuse of a dominant position or competition restricting agreements. 
Nevertheless, the scope of sector-specific regulation often closely resembles that 
of competition law, especially with respect to margin squeeze, predatory prices 
etc. However, the two set of rules only exceptionally overlap to an extent that 
would exclude the exercise of parallel competences of the given NRA and NCA. 
Whilst the conclusion of the Regional Court concerning the question of 
the competences of the Slovak competition authority may be disputable to 
some extent, the conclusions of the Supreme Court are not sustainable at 
all. It is simply not possible to accept the opinion that sole subordination of 
a particular industry sector to the supervision of a regulator would totally 
exclude the competences of the competition authority in this field. Such an 
approach would seriously jeopardize the effectiveness of competition law 
enforcement in regulated sectors. 
V. Nullum crimen sine lege – application of the so-called ‘general clause’
The judgment of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic in case of 
Marianum-Pohrebníctvo mesta Bratislavy, príspevková organizácia (hereafter, 
Marianum)18, case no. 3Sžh/3/2010
The Supreme Court decided here on an appeal lodged by Marianum against 
a judgment of the Regional Court in Bratislava. 
16 See e.g. the judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU in joined cases C-359/95 P and 
379/95 P Commission v Landbroke Racing, ECR [1997] I-6301.
17 OECD policy roundtables: Relationships between Regulators and Competition Authorities, 
1998 (available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/38/38819635.pdf): ‘Competition policy is 
chiefly ex post (merger review excepted) whereas regulation is primarily ex ante and continuous. 
When regulation is applied, there will typically be a pre-supposition that market forces cannot 
be relied on to produce a satisfactory outcome and this cannot be rectified merely by trying to 
change firms’ incentives’.
18 Judgment of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic of 3 May 2011, case 
no. 3/Sžh/3/2010. 
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Marianum is an organisation established by the municipality of Bratislava 
which provides cemetery and funeral services within this city’s territory. The 
Slovak competition authority found in 200819 that Marianum was engaged 
in exclusionary practices by not allowing competing undertakers to provide 
certain funeral services in the premises of cemeteries and crematories managed 
by Marianum. Its competitors were excluded from providing services such as 
religious activities or funeral carrier services. Simultaneously, the dominant 
company was fund to have directly exploited consumers by imposing upon them 
unreasonable fees: a fee for the disposal of flower donations after a funeral 
and a fee charged to new tenants for the disposal of an old gravestone inside 
the cemetery compound. 
It was not possible to subsume such conduct under any of the forms of 
abuse explicitly listed in the Slovak Act on the Protection of Competition 
(hereafter, Competition Act). For that reason, the AMO applied in this case 
the general provisions of the Competition Act that prohibit any abuse, the so 
called ‘general clause’20. The application of the general clause is based on the 
general idea that competition law is very a dynamic field of law – an explicit 
enumeration of abuse forms (or, in fact, of the forms of competition restricting 
agreements) would be unable to cover all the possible variations of unilateral 
anticompetitive behaviour21.  The Regional Court in Bratislava rejected the 
action submitted by Marianum which sought the annulment of the decisions 
of the AMO but the Supreme Court reversed the first instance judgment. 
The use of the general clause was central to the ruling of the Supreme Court 
which decided that punishing Marianum for breaching the general clause came 
into conflict with the nullum crimen sine lege rule. The Supreme Court stated 
that although it was possible to apply the general clause to anticompetitive 
behaviour, but it was at the same time not possible to impose a punishment 
for it. According to the Supreme Court, the application of the general clause 
amounts to the creation of a new form of competition law violation. In other 
words, when the AMO decides to apply the general clause, it creates, in 
19 Decision of the Council of the AMO of 19 December 2008 (no. 2008/DZ/R/2/113) in 
conjunction with the decision of the AMO of 30 June 2008 (decision no. 2008/DZ/R/2/113).
20 The general clause is set out in Section 8 of the Slovak Act on Protection of Competition 
concerning the abuse of dominance; it reads: ‘Abuse of a dominant position in the relevant 
market is prohibited’.
21 See e.g. D. Raus, R. Neruda, Zákon o ochraně hospodářské soutěže, Komentář a souvisící 
české i komunitární předpisy, Praha 2006, p. 174: According to the authors, the construction of 
the provision prohibiting abuse based on the use of the general clause is indispensable. It is 
simply not possible to cover all types of anticompetitive behaviour by the strict enumeration of 
their merits since the insidiousness of such behaviour and complexity of its evaluation increases 
with time. See also K. Kalesná, O. Blažo, Zákon o ochrane hospodárskej súťaže (komentár), 
Brno 2012, p. 47.
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essence, the merits of a new infringement. The term “merits” means, in this 
context, the characteristics of a particular anticompetitive behaviour. The 
Supreme Court stated that ‘the proportionality rule requires that if the AMO 
is, on the one side, competent to create new merits of the abuse of dominant 
position on the basis of the general clause then the undertaking has, on the 
other side, the right to be acquainted with the merits of the anticompetitive 
behaviour which is forbidden’. 
The conclusions of the Supreme Court raise many questions. 
The wording of the provisions of the Slovak Competition Act has been 
constructed in accordance with the text of the Treaty on the functioning 
of the European Union. Other Member States have constructed their 
national provisions likewise on the basis of the demonstrative enumeration 
of prohibited anticompetitive behaviours contained in EU legal system. 
Truthfully, the general clause does not specify any particular characteristic of 
anticompetitive behaviours22. It simply stipulates that: ‘abuse of a dominant 
position is prohibited’. The general rule can thus be considered at first sight 
to be a kind of blank norm which makes it possible to punish almost any kind 
of unilateral behaviour.
It is indisputable that competition law is a comprehensive and complex legal 
field and that it is often subject to wide-reaching inquiries and assessments 
by competition authorities. It is also not always clear at the beginning of 
an investigation whether the scrutinised undertaking actually engaged in 
a prohibited practice. Still, competition law and policy are largely harmonised 
among EU Member States and individual NCA usually base their decisions 
on the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU and case law of the 
European Commission. True originality of anticompetitive conduct is therefore 
rather rare. 
This realisation leads to another problem. The Supreme Court associated 
here the ‘originality of the case’ with the application of the general clause. 
It presupposed that when the AMO applied the general clause, it identified 
a completely new form of anticompetitive behaviour that had never been 
considered before. However, the correlation between originality and the use 
of the general clause does not have to be necessarily true and, in fact, did 
22 Cp. the Article 11 of the Czech Act no. 143/2001 Coll. of 4 April 2001 on the Protection 
of Competition and on Amendment to Certain Acts (Act on the Protection of Competition) as 
amended by Act No. 340/2004 Coll. of 4 May 2004, Act No. 484/2004 Coll. Of 5 August 2004, Act 
No. 127/2005 Coll. of 22 February, Act No. 361/2005 Coll. of 19 August 2005, Act No. 71/2007 
Coll. of 4 April 2007, Act No. 296/2007 Coll. of 1 January 2008 and Act No. 155/2009 Coll. of 
1 September 2009.
‘(1)  Abuse of dominant position to the detriment of other undertakings or consumers shall 
be prohibited’.
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not exist in the given case. In the Slovak Republic, the need to apply the 
general clause may arise, for instance, when the merits of an anticompetitive 
behaviour expressed in the Competition Act simply do not reflect the nature 
of the scrutinised practice. Such is the case with margin squeeze, for instance, 
a restrictive practice considered before by many competition authorities, 
including the European Commission. Margin squeeze is, however, hard to 
classify as an unfair price practice, a form of abuse explicitly listed both in the 
Slovak Competition Act and Article 102 TFEU. 
The assertion must be supported therefore that when a seemingly new 
anticompetitive behaviour is under consideration, it is necessary to assess it with 
reference to its actual originality. It is reasonable, for instance, to significantly 
reduce the fine imposed in such cases23. This approach goes in line with the 
case law of the European Commission, which has sometimes decided to refrain 
from the imposition of a fine, if the scrutinised case contained a ‘new element’ 
that had not been considered before24. This approach takes into account the 
necessary predictability of the actions of competition authorities25.
VI. Bank cartel judgment 
The judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Československá obchodná 
banka, a.s. (hereafter, CSOB), case no. 5 Sžh/4/201026
The Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic decided here on an appeal 
submitted by the competition authority against a judgment of the Regional 
23 See e.g. the decision of the AMO in case ENVI-PAK.
24 e.g. decision of the Commission no. 93/438/EEC of 30 June 1993 (IV/33.407 – CNSD) 
or case no. 96/438/EC of 5 June 1996 (IV/34.983 – Fenex). Cf. F. Dethmers, H. Engelen, 
‘Fines under article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’ (2011) 2 
E.C.L.R. 96. Authors criticise therein the fact that companies have only limited success in 
arguing against (high) fines on such grounds under the per se illegality approach under art. 
102 TFEU. According to the authors, there are few cases where no fines were imposed due to 
the novel nature of the abuse concerned, but such defence is only accepted under exceptional 
circumstances when there is no precedent to which the case might be compared. 
25 Cf. B. Vesterdorf, ‘Article 102 TFEU and Sanctions: Appropriate When?’ (2011) 11 
E.C.L.R. 577. According to the author, Article 102 TFEU is not drafted in clear, precise and 
unambiguous language and therefore does not create legal certainty. However the author 
stresses that the lack of clarity of a  rule of law may to some extent be remedied by the 
interpretation of the provision given by the courts. This can only apply to the situation in which 
the undertaking knew or clearly should have known that such conduct might be unlawful and 
that the undertaking could not reasonably be in doubt as to its dominant position. 
26 Judgment of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic of 19 May 2011 (case no. 5 Sžh 
4/2010).
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Court in Bratislava, which annulled AMO’s decision concerning a cartel of 
three banks. The decision27 issued by the competition authority established 
the existence and operation of a competition restricting agreement between 
three banks (including CSOB). The contested practice allegedly consisted 
of an agreement on the termination and consecutive non-conclusion of new 
contracts on current accounts with the company AKCENTA CZ, a. s. The 
competition authority had at its disposal a variety of evidence in this case and 
based its decision on the existence of a meeting between the parties to the 
proceedings, e-mails that followed, and their conduct on the market.
The decision of the AMO was annulled by the Regional Court in Bratislava 
as well as the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic. The particularity of the 
judicial review of this case is worth noting. Despite the fact that Slovak law 
enables the courts to assess in one proceeding all actions lodged against the 
same administrative decision, the legality of decisions issued by the competition 
authority in this case was reviewed in three independent proceedings, by both 
courts, on the basis of three different actions submitted by the parties. In fact, 
the AMO still awaits a Supreme Court ruling in the case of two banks28. 
Both courts arrived at the same conclusions during their proceedings namely 
that AKCENTA did not hold the licence for the performance of business 
activities on the foreign-exchange market of the Slovak Republic. The courts 
refused the AMO’s objections that the conduct of the plaintiff (as well as of 
the other banks) should have been seen as anticompetitive irrespective of 
the fact whether it was directed at an existing or potential market player. As 
opposed to the competition authority, the courts concluded that the realisation 
whether the contested practice was directed against an entity that conducted 
its business in the Slovak territory legally, and thus enjoyed legal protection 
for its business, was of relevance to the assessment of the anticompetitive 
nature of the banks’ behaviour. In the opinion of the courts, the scrutinised 
banks had the right to eliminate such an activity. The courts did not accept 
the objections of the competition authority that the aim of its activities is not 
to protect particular undertakings but the competition process overall. In the 
AMO’s view, the conclusion cannot be accepted that the banks had the right 
to eliminate a company which had been operating unlawfully by way of their 
own anticompetitive behaviour. 
The AMO stressed that the National Bank of Slovakia did not issue 
a  decision finding that AKCENTA’s operations on the foreign-exchange 
market were illegal in the period when the agreement was concluded (and 
AKCENTA’s accounts cancelled). The courts replied that the AMO had not 
27 Decision of the Council of the AMO no. 209/KH/R/2/054 of 19 November 2009 in 
conjunction with the decision of the AMO no. 2009/KH/1/1/030 of 9 June 2009.
28 The Regional Court in Bratislava annulled the decision of the AMO in all three cases.
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proven that the said company had in fact operated in the territory of the Slovak 
Republic legally, that is, that it had indeed held a licence for the performance 
of the contested activity. 
The issue of the illegality of AKCENTA’s business operation is especially 
interesting from the point of view of an anticompetitive object and/or effect. 
The agreement subject of the decision of the AMO was a multilateral 
practice which had as its object29 the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition. According to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU, 
it is unnecessary to consider the actual effects of an agreement if it is apparent 
that it has an anticompetitive object30. The distinction between infringements 
by object and infringements by effects arises from the fact that certain forms 
of collusion can be regarded as being injurious to the proper functioning of 
normal competition by their very nature31. These agreements are prohibited 
per se, even when they are directed against only a ‘potential’ market player. 
Making a distinction between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ market players would distort 
the perception of economic reality. Public enforcement of competition law is 
not intended to protect particular competitors, but the competition process 
as such. 
The question of the illegality of AKCENTA’s activities has proven crucial 
to the remaining proceedings concerning the actions of the rest of the alleged 
participants of the anticompetitive practice. The Supreme Court of the Slovak 
Republic has recently brought this question to the Court of Justice of the 
EU expecting a preliminary ruling to resolve the original case32. Interestingly, 
29 See R. Whish, Competition law, 5th edition, London 2003, p.110: ‘The word ‘object’ in 
this context means not the subjective intention of the parties when entering into the agreement, 
but the objective meaning and purpose of the agreement considered in the economic context 
in which it is to be applied’.
30 45/85 Verband der Sachversicherer v. European Commission, ECR [1987] 00405, para. 39.
31 C-209/07 Beef industry Development and Barry Brothers, ECR [2008] I-8637, para. 17, See 
also R. Whish, Competition law, p. 11.: ‘The classification of an agreement as having as its object 
the restriction of competition means that the parties, for example to a price-fixing agreement 
,cannot argue that the fixing of prices does not restrict competition: the law has decided, as 
a matter of policy, that it does…’.
32 Case no C-68/12, Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Najvyšší súd Slovenskej 
republiky (the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic), lodged on 10 February 2012 – Slovenská 
sporiteľňa, a.s. v Protimonopolný Úrad Slovenskej Republiky (the AMO). 
Questions referred:
Is Article 101(1) TFEU (formerly Article 81(1) EC) to be interpreted as meaning that it is 
of legal relevance that a competitor (trader) adversely affected by a cartel agreement between 
other competitors (traders) was operating on the relevant market illegally at the time when the 
cartel agreement was concluded?
For the purposes of interpreting Article 101(1) TFEU (formerly Article 81(1) EC), is it of 
legal relevance that, at the time when the cartel agreement was concluded, the legality of that 
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one of the questions submitted by the Slovak court concerned the relevance 
of the fact that when the scrutinised practice was concluded, the legality of 
AKCENTA’s activities was not impugned. Awaiting a preliminary ruling, the 
proceedings before the Slovak Supreme Court are pending33.
VII. Infringement of a decision prohibiting a concentration 
The judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Phoenix – medical supply, 
a.s. (hereafter, Phoenix), case no. 1 Sžhpú 4/200834
In 2005, the Slovak competition authority imposed a fine amounting to
c. 1 000 000 Euro on two undertakings, Phoenix and Biama, for their non-com-
pliance with an earlier decision prohibiting their merger35. The AMO 
considered the conduct of these two undertakings to be a serious offence, 
and thus imposed such a large fine. Both companies acted on the same 
relevant market for the wholesale distribution of pharmaceuticals and medical 
instruments. The merger would have led to the creation of a dominant position 
on the relevant market. 
The Regional Court in Bratislava reviewed the decision of the AMO and by 
its judgment36 substantially reduced the fine (from 1 000 000 to c. 16 600 Euro.) 
Pursuant to the Court, the fine originally imposed was too repressive. The 
competitor‘s (trader‘s) conduct was not called in question by the competent supervisory bodies 
in the Slovak Republic?
Is Article 101(1) TFEU (formerly Article 81(1) EC) to be interpreted as meaning that, in 
order to find that an agreement is restrictive of competition, it is necessary to demonstrate 
personal conduct on the part of the representative authorised under the undertaking‘s 
constitution or the personal assent, in the form of a mandate, of that representative, who 
has (or may have) taken part in that agreement, to the conduct of one of the undertaking‘s 
employees, where the undertaking has not distanced itself from the conduct of that employee 
and, at the same time, the agreement has even been implemented?
Is Article 101(3) TFEU (formerly Article 81(3) EC) to be interpreted as also applying to 
an agreement prohibited under Article 101(1) TFEU (formerly Article 81(1) EC) which by its 
nature has the effect of excluding from the market a specific individual competitor (trader) 
which has subsequently been found to have been carrying out foreign currency transactions on 
the cashless payment transactions market without holding the appropriate licence as required 
under national law?
33 See also: M. Nosa, ‘Vec AKCENTA CZ, alebo dokazovanie kartelu’ (2011) 1 Antitrust 
32–37.
34 The judgment of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic of 25 January 2011.
35 The decision of the Council of the AMO no. 2005/FH/R/2/090 of 26 August 2005 in 
conjunction with the decision of the AMO no. 2005/FH/3/1/061 of 20 May 2005.
36 The judgment of the Regional Court in Bratislava of 19 June 2008, case no. 1S 314/2005.
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Court concluded that the fine fulfils both preventive and repressive functions. 
According to the Court, the authority focused on the latter purpose only. 
The Supreme Court did not agree with the conclusions of the Regional 
Court in Bratislava and upheld the fine originally imposed by the AMO. Its 
judgment is particularly interesting in terms of the scope of the powers of 
the court when reviewing administrative decisions. The Regional Court acted 
in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Procedural Code. Aside from 
upholding or annulling an administrative decision, the Civil Procedure Code 
empowers the courts to change the amount of fines imposed in administrative 
proceedings. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic stated that a court 
should not assess the expediency and suitability of an administrative decision. 
When reviewing it, courts should only examine whether the decision did 
not go beyond its legal limits, whether it complied with the rules of logical 
thinking and whether it was based on comprehensive information collected by 
appropriate procedures. If these conditions are met, courts should not draw 
from the same circumstances different or contrary conclusions to those of the 
administrative body. 
The Slovak judicial review system of administrative decisions was 
traditionally based on the cassation principle – courts did not have the power 
to change administrative decisions; they could only annul them or dismiss the 
action of the claimant (i.e. uphold the decision of the administrative body). 
The requirements of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
led to the creation of a new power for the courts when reviewing decisions 
of administrative bodies, such as the AMO. Since 2002, Slovak courts have 
thus the right to change the amount of the fine imposed on the parties of 
administrative proceedings. When reviewing administrative decisions, courts 
usually base their analysis on facts established by the administrative body. 
However, they can consider new evidence if necessary in order to review an 
administrative decision. 
This raises questions as to the role of the courts when reviewing 
administrative decisions. Do they have the power to replace administrative 
bodies in the fulfilment of their functions? 
Taking into consideration all aspects of the administrative justice system, 
the most satisfactory conclusion to arrive at is that the role of the relevant 
authorities, such as the AMO, should be preserved. The purpose of judicial 
review should not replace the functions of administrative bodies. Instead, 
courts should solely examine if the authorities adhered to the corresponding 
laws. Since full jurisdiction should be understood in the context of the role of 
the competition authority has to play, courts should explore new evidence only 
exceptionally and only if it is of sufficient importance. It is hard to imagine 
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the judiciary resolving issues such as relevant market definition37, for instance. 
In such cases, courts should simply ensure that administrative bodies conduct 
properly the fact-finding process38. This opinion complies with the judgment of 
the Court in the Phoenix case where it was said that courts could not interfere 
with the discretion of administrative bodies when assessing particular cases. 
VIII. Conclusions
It follows from the jurisprudential review above that when it comes to 
the application of competition rules, Slovak courts often diverge from the 
European decision-making practice.
Even after 20 years of the functioning of the market economy, competition 
rules are often viewed as a new element in the Slovak legal order. This may be 
partly caused by the specific character of competition law, the most important 
attribute of which is its dynamic character which enables it to cover most 
anticompetitive market practices. In order to do so, competition law is based 
on a limited number of sparse written rules that are subject to extensive 
jurisprudential interpretation. Competition law is also characterised by the 
increasing use of economic evidence. Both the dynamics and economisation 
of competition law may conflict the nature of the Slovak legal order which is 
traditionally based on comprehensive written rules and where jurisprudence 
is not considered to be a legal source (this conflict was evident, for instance, 
in the Marianum judgment). 
Judgments such as the Railway Company Cargo and the Phoenix Biama case 
show that it is necessary, above all else, to clarify the relationship between the 
role of the Slovak competition authority and the role of national courts when 
assessing competition cases. 
It appears also that coherent application of competition law within the 
EU requires closer cooperation between Slovak courts and the European 
Commission as well as between national judiciary and the AMO. This 
37 This concept resembles the concept of the scope of judicial review of administrative 
decisions in the EU developed by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU. 
Accordingly, as far as the complex economic assessment of the Commission are concerned, 
EU courts are confined to verifying if the rules on procedure and on statement of reasons were 
complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated and if a manifest error of appraisal 
or misuse of power occurred (see joined cases C-204/00P, C-205/00P, C-213/00P, C-217/00P and 
C- 219/00P Aalborg Portland v Commission) in: F.O.W. Vogelaar, The European competition rules, 
landmark cases of the European Courts and the Commission, 2nd ed., Groningen 2007, p. 341. 
38 See also S. Šramelová, T. Britvík, ‘Plná jurisdikcia súdov pri preskúmavaní správnych 
rozhodnutí’ (2010) 6–7 Justičná revue 819–827.
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cooperation may be based on informal discussions on contentious issues or on 
the organization of workshops and training courses in the field of competition 
law. Whichever way is used, active participation of both Slovak judges and 
AMO representatives is vital to its success. This may help intensify informal 
dialogue on the most controversial competition law issues and deepen the 
understanding of the entire competition law field. 
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